It is commonly assumed in (linguistic) pragmatics that communication involves speakers expressing their intentions through verbal and nonverbal means, and recipients recognizing or attributing those attentions to speakers. Upon closer examination of various pragmatic phenomena in discourse, however, it appears the situation is actually much more complex than the standard conceptualization of communication in pragmatics allows. In particular, it is suggested in this paper that the focus on expressing and recognizing/attributing (speaker) intentions underestimates the dynamic nature and complexity of cognition that underpins interaction. The notion of 'dyadic cognizing' is thus introduced as a way of reconceptualizing the inferential work that underlies communication. It is suggested that such inferential work is 'directed' and thus is inherently 'intentional' in the sense proposed by Brentano, but need not necessarily be 'directed' towards the 'intentions' of speakers.
Introduction
The analysis of the use of language in communicative situations is seen as core business in pragmatics. Assumptions made about how we might best conceptualize communication are thus crucial to much of the research that has been carried out in pragmatics over the past 40 years. While the field of pragmatics encompasses a diverse range of approaches to language use, much of the research can be aligned with two fairly broad traditions: cognitive-philosophical pragmatics (alternatively known as linguistic pragmatics or Anglo-American pragmatics), and sociocultural-interactional pragmatics (or so-called European-Continental pragmatics).
The first broad research tradition in pragmatics, which is founded on the seminal work of Grice (1967 Grice ( [1989 Grice ( ], 1975 , is the one most likely to be familiar to linguists, as it conceives of pragmatics as being 'a core component of a theory of language, on par with phonetics, phonology, morphology, syntax and semantics' (Huang 2007: 4) . In cognitive-philosophical pragmatics, speaker meaning is claimed as the central concern of pragmatics. Speaker meaning is defined as arising from speakers expressing intentions through what they say, and recipients recognizing or attributing those intentions to speakers. The importance of intention in the cognitive-philosophical tradition in pragmatics can be traced back directly to Grice's (1957) seminal work on (speaker) meaning. Grice argued that a speaker meant NN something by x if and only if S 'intended the utterance of x to produce some effect in an audience by means of the recognition of this intention' (Grice 1957: 385) . This crucial insight*or variants thereof*has been carried into research on deixis, presupposition, implicature, and speech acts, as well as politeness and other phenomena of interest in pragmatics. The notion of intention thus lies at the core of most definitions of speaker meaning prevalent in pragmatics to date. However, while Grice's programme was focused on developing an intention-based theory of meaning (among other things), a move was made fairly early on in the development of the field of pragmatics, perhaps not necessarily intended by Grice himself (Arundale 2008: 237) , to equate speaker meaning with communication.
The conceptualization of communication as the expression and recognition/ attribution of speaker intentions underlies much of the theorizing in Gricean and neo-Gricean pragmatics (Bach & Harnish 1979: 3; Bach 2004: 470; Dascal 2003: 22Á 23; Grice 1967 Grice [1989 ; Horn 2004: 3; Jaszczolt 2002: 249; Levinson 1983 Levinson : 16Á18, 2000 On the one hand, speaker intentions still remain in some form at the heart of conceptualizations of communication that underpin such research (Lo Castro 2003: 48; Mey 2001: 85) . It appears, then, that while the role intention itself plays is somewhat equivocal in sociocultural-interactional pragmatics, intentions are still seen as playing at least some role in the prevailing conceptualization of communication.
One of the most important assumptions made about communication in pragmatics has thus been the claim that it involves speakers expressing their intentions through verbal and nonverbal means, and recipients attributing intentions to those speakers, a view that is consistent with folk conceptualizations of communication amongst English speakers (Goddard 2009 ).
1 While this claim has reached an almost axiomatic status in pragmatics, it is argued in this paper that the place of intention in the conceptualization of communication underlying much research in pragmatics is much more controversial than is for the most part allowed (see also Haugh 2008a) . In particular, it is suggested the commonly held view that communication involves recipients 'correctly' making inferences about the speaker's intentions underestimates the complexity of cognizing that underlies interaction. This does not amount to the claim that speakers do not at times have particular motivations or plans underlying what they are saying, or that recipients do not at times make inferences about what has motivated the speaker to say something. There is a large volume of work in pragmatics, as well as in the cognitive sciences and related disciplines, to suggest that such inferential work does indeed occur. The question is whether such inferential work, located in the minds of individuals, is sufficient to account for the kinds of communicative phenomena that are analysed in pragmatics.
In this paper, after giving a brief overview of the ways in which communication is conceptualized in pragmatics, the epistemological and ontological ambiguities that arise as a consequence of reducing communication to intention recognition/ attribution are discussed. An alternative approach to cognition, which is argued to be more consistent with the view of communication as an interactional achievement (Nevile & Rendle-Short 2009) , is then proposed. This is followed by a brief consideration of the implications of such a move for the place intention(ality) can still play in the conceptualization of communication in pragmatics research.
The Ambiguity of Intentions in Interaction
Despite its importance to conceptualizations of communication in cognitivephilosophical pragmatics, and somewhat equivocal status in sociocultural-interactional pragmatics, the conceptualization of the notion of intention itself is rarely commented upon in the pragmatics literature (Haugh 2008a ). An analysis of implicit assumptions made about intention in analysing communication, however, reveals that it is invariably conceptualized as an a priori, conscious mental state of individual speakers (Gibbs 1999 (Gibbs : 23, 2001 Mann 2003: 165) .
If one considers the manner in which implicatures, for instance, arise in actual discourse though, the picture becomes somewhat more complex. In the next example, an implied request appears to arise.
(1) 1 A: Hullo I was wondering whether you were intending to go to Popper's talk this afternoon 2 B: Not today I'm afraid I can't make it to this one 3 A: Ah okay 4 B: You wanted me to record it didn't you heh! 5
A: Yeah heheh 6 B: Heheh no I'm sorry about that . . . (Levinson 1983: 358 ).
It appears at first glance that A's first utterance in line 1 can be interpreted as a prerequest (Levinson 1983: 358) , where a pre-request is broadly defined as a question checking whether some precondition obtains for the request to be performed in a subsequent utterance by the speaker (Levinson 1983: 346) . In this interaction, the pre-request in line 1 involves explicit reference to B's intentions (that is, B's future plans) in relation to (Karl) Popper's talk. However, B's response in line 2 indicates a specific precondition relevant to A's request, namely attending Popper's talk that afternoon, is not being met by B, and thus the projected request is no longer viable. The interaction continues when B suggests in line 4 that A was intending to ask B to record the talk, and thus makes explicit reference to A's (higher-order) intentions (that is, what A wanted to achieve by asking this question). A goes on to admit as much in line 5, and B responds in line 6 by apologizing for not being able to comply with A's request. According to the received view, this implicature is generated through recognition by the recipient of the speaker's intention to imply a request. For instance, according to a Gricean account it is just by B recognizing that A intended B to recognize that A is asking B to record the lecture that a (particularized) implicature arises (cf. Grice 1957: 385) , while according to a Relevance theoretic account it is just by B recognizing that A has the (communicative) intention to make it mutually manifest that A has the (informative) intention to let B know he is asking B to record the lecture that an implicature is ostensively communicated (cf. Sperber & Wilson 1995: 29) .
A key problem with such an explanation, however, is that it potentially gives rise to ontological ambiguity in regards to the analysts' understanding of what is communicated vis-à-vis the participants (Arundale 2008: 240Á241; Bilmes 1986; Haugh 2008c: 52; Potter 2006: 135) . This circularity arises for conceptualizations of communication where 'an analyst claims that talk shows evidence for a particular psychological state or process' and then goes on to 'explain the production of that talk in terms of the existence of [that particular psychological state or process]' (Antaki et al. 2003: 13Á14) . In relation to intentions, then, it is potentially circular to treat this possible pre-request as evidence of the speaker's intention to make a request, and then go on to explicate this implied request in terms of those intentions (cf. Potter 2006: 135Á136) .
In other words, the assumption that this interaction involves B working out A's intentions actually masks a number of complex epistemological and ontological questions:
1. where exactly can this intention be located in the discourse? 2. who exactly can be held responsible for this intention? 3. just how (consciously) aware are the interactants of this intention?
It is evident from this interaction, then, that an implicature has arisen. While A did not actually literally make a request at any point, it is apparent that both A and B understand a request was made, and thus something has been implied in addition to what has literally been said (Haugh 2002 (Haugh , 2007 . But when exactly does this implicature arise? There is not sufficient evidence in this interaction to definitively conclude that B inferred that A was requesting him to make a recording of Popper's talk during or after A's initial question in line 1. B responds only to what has been said by A in line 2, and while this is in effect a 'blocking response' to the pre-request (Liddicoat 2007: 132Á133; Schegloff 2007: 90) , we cannot be sure that B understood A's question as a pre-request at this point in the interaction. A responds in line 3 with an 'ah' particle that orients towards B's response as informing him of something he did not know before (Heritage 1984b; Liddicoat 2007: 152; Schegloff 2007: 118) , followed by marker 'okay' which displays acceptance of the stance embodied in B's response, in this case a 'dispreferred second' that indicates possible closure of the prerequest sequence (Liddicoat 2007: 155; Schelgoff 2007: 121) . Following on from this projected closure, B re-opens the sequence in line 4 by then going on to make a metapragmatic comment about A's underlying intentions. It is only at this point that we have unequivocal evidence that B has indeed interpreted A's initial question in line 1 as implying a request, and so we might conclude that B made this inference in response to A's attempted closure of the possible pre-request sequence. But this conclusion is not necessarily warranted either, since the utterance type found in line 1, where A initially asks B about his plans in relation to Popper's talk, appears frequently enough in English for it to be possible for B to anticipate that A might be planning to ask something of him (Levinson 1983; Liddicoat 2007: 133) . B may therefore have guessed about A's intentions to make a request fairly soon after processing A's utterance in line 1. It is consequently difficult indeed to pin down exactly when or where this implicature, and so B's possible inferences about A's intentions, arises in this sequence. The difficulties experienced in trying to locate a priori intentions in interactional data suggests that there is in fact often temporal ambiguity in relation to the process of intention formation and recognition/ attribution that is assumed to underlie communication (Drew 2005; Haugh 2008b,c; Heritage 1990/91; Hopper 2005) .
Another layer of ontological ambiguity also exists in regards to how recipients know the intentions of speakers, and in particular, whether we are really talking about the speaker's intentions or the intentions attributed to the speaker by the recipient. The intentionÁattribution model of communication privileges the speaker's intention in determining what is communicated, yet in this interaction the work of 'communicating' this implicature was done not only by A but also by B. In this sense, A can no longer be held entirely responsible for this particular implied request. This is not to deny that A may have had some a priori mental construct inside his mind before making the utterance in line 1, but in regards to what is communicated, it is not this a priori mental construct that appears to be most salient, but rather interactionally achieved participant understandings of what was implied. More generally, various studies have indicated that how what is said, implied and so on is understood by recipients is just as important as what speakers might have intended in regards to what is communicated (Arundale 1999; Bilmes 1993; Cooren 2005; Haugh 2007 Haugh , 2008b Sbisà 1992) . Moreover, as Arundale (2008) (Bilmes 1986: 110; cf. Haugh 2008c: 51Á52) .
Finally, there is also epistemological ambiguity as to the status of the intention(s) involved in this interaction. Are either A or B, for example, consciously aware of an intention on the part of A in uttering 'ah okay' in line 3 to either project closure of the pre-request sequence, or alternatively to hint that there is more to the interaction than has been said? Where there is clear evidence that the interactants are (consciously) aware of the existence of intentions in the course of this interaction, this is only because intention has been referred to (line 1), topicalized (line 4) or ratified (line 5). Rather than involving Gricean or Relevance theoretic intentions, then, the participants appear to be referring to other senses of the folk notion of intention. As Gibbs (1999: 22Á23) points out, intention encompasses multiple, interdependent senses: (1) expressing future plans of self; (2) ascribing to or asking of others their future plans; (3) describing what oneself or others want to achieve by doing or saying something; and (4) classifying actions as being done with the speaker's awareness of the implications of them. In this particular interaction, we can find reference to sense (2) of intention in line 1, and reference to sense (3) in lines 4Á 5. More importantly, we can see that B makes explicit reference to intention in line 4 in order to hold A accountable for both what he has said and what is (allegedly) implied. In other words, referring to or topicalizing intention is a discursive means of holding speakers accountable for what is communicated (Bonaiuto & Fasulo 1997: 533; Edwards 2006 Edwards , 2008 Haugh 2008b,c; Heritage 1988; Schegloff 1991) .
The ambiguity surrounding intentions in interaction that has been discussed in this section points to the ways in which meaning(s) emerge in communication (see also Nevile & Rendle-Short 2009) . Such a discussion might appear to favour sociocultural-interactional accounts of communication in pragmatics. However, to point towards the complexity inherent in the inferential work underlying communication 'should not be taken to mean that we do not end up considering what the speaker's actual inner state was' (Sanders 2005: 63) . While those working in the related field of conversation analysis, for instance, may remain somewhat 'agnostic' as to questions of intention and cognition (Drew 1995: 135; Heritage 1990/91: 329; Hopper 2005: 149; Mandelbaum & Pomerantz 1991: 163; Pomerantz 1990/91; Potter 2006: 138) , for those working in pragmatics the question still remains 'whether it is possible to develop a theoretical framework for pragmatic analysis that can account for both the social grounding of language use and its cognitive structure' (Marmaridou 2000: 39) . In other words, an approach to communication that combines 'cognitive' and 'interactional' paradigms (Gibbs 1999: 45) . In the next section, it is suggested that it is not what is going on inside the 'minds' of these interactants per se that is necessarily crucial, but rather the dynamic inter-relationship between cognizing and interaction that proves most salient.
Cognizing in Interaction
The conceptualization of communication as being emergent or interactionally achieved has at least two important implications for how we analyse the inferencing that presumably underlies implicatures, presuppositions, speech acts and other pragmatic phenomena in communication. The first is that such inferencing is always contingent. This intuition has been commonly represented in pragmatics through the claim that such inferences are defeasible (or alternatively cancellable or suspendable) (Bach 2006; Blome-Tillmann 2008; Burton-Roberts 2006; Grice 1967 Grice [1989 Levinson 2000: 15; Sadock 1978) . However, there is evidence to suggest that many inferences are neither explicitly deniable nor implicitly suspendable through the addition of contextual information (Carston 2002: 138Á139; Haugh 2008d: 445Á446; Weiner 2006) . It is thus suggested here that the emergence of meaning through communication, and so the contingency of the inferential work underlying pragmatic phenomena, is more productively understood in terms of anticipatory and retroactive inferencing (Arundale 2008; Arundale & Good 2002; Good 1995) . Each participant's processing in using language involves a set of concurrent cognitive operations that are temporally extended, not only forward in time in recipient design of their own utterances and in anticipation of other's talk . . . but also backwards in time in the retroactive assessing of interpretations of what has already been produced in their own and in other's utterances (Arundale & Good 2002: 135) .
In other words, the cognizing underlying communication is contingent because both speakers and recipients are simultaneously engaged in anticipatory and retroactive inferencing in producing and comprehending utterances.
In the following excerpt from an interview between the researcher (MH) and an elderly New Zealand woman (MP) about communication styles in New Zealand English at her house, for instance, we can find indications of retroactive inferencing. In lines 1Á8 we see that MP offers MH a biscuit to eat and that both then subsequently start eating the biscuits. The interaction then moves to the issue of a plate for the biscuits in lines 10Á13 (which were offered directly from a container This retroactive reassessment of a previous inference is not simply a matter of a miscommunicated 'intention', however, as it is not clear whether MP even had any such 'intention' prior to her utterance in line 13. Instead, it involves a subtle negotiation over the course of a number of utterances of the meaning of MP's utterance, transforming it from a straightforward offer into a much more equivocal speech act, where an indirect request is a possible additional interpretation. Inferencing is not only directed retroactively, however, but may also be oriented in anticipation of what is coming in an interaction (Haugh 2003) . Co-construction, where one's utterance is 'finished' by someone else (Goodwin 1979 (Goodwin , 1995 Hayashi 1999; Jacoby & Ochs 1995) , or where a common stance is achieved by more than one participant, for instance, constitutes evidence that participants (can) engage in anticipatory inferencing in communication. In the following excerpt, knowledge of a common idiomatic expression, 'lay back and think of England', allows one friend to 'finish' the other's utterance.
(3) (Two friends are talking at university about the foul-tasting coffee they are drinking, J is male, L is female) (ICE-AUS, S1A-020) In line 3, we can see that L 'finishes' J's utterance which started in line 1 after a brief pause (line 2), which indicates that perhaps J's attention has shifted from what he is saying or alternatively that he is having trouble recalling the end of the idiom. In this context the idiom means that they will just have to suffer the bad coffee in stoical silence. In other words, L has prospectively inferred that J will say 'England' to complete the idiom, and does so before he says it.
In the next excerpt, however, we can see that 'anticipating' what others are going to say is not restricted to formulaic or idiomatic expressions. The way in which these three university students co-construct a common stance in regards what it is like living in a college dormitory is also indicative of the practice of anticipatory inferencing in communication. (4) (Three young university students are talking at their dormitory, A is female, B and C are males) (ICE-AUS, S1A-029) The stance in this excerpt is contributed to by all three students. A's utterance about the difficulties one has in living between places in line 1 is picked up by B in lines 4Á6, for instance. Here B repeats the last three words of A's previous turn in his speaking turn and thereby 'completes' the stance initiated by A in claiming the difficulty in question relates to not having all one's possessions in one place. Another difficulty arising from living in a dormitory, namely, the feeling of always wanting to return to the dormitory when one goes home, is raised by A in lines 7 and 9, and this is immediately followed by C's comment in line 10 that, on the other hand, when one is at the dormitory one is also always waiting to go home. In doing so, speakers A and C co-construct the contradictory feelings they have when living in the dormitory, and this contradiction gives rise to laughter. A's endorsement of C's anticipation of what she was going to say in line 14 following the laughter also indicates that this related stance was indeed co-constructed. It is important to note that in accounting for the co-construction of this common stance on the difficulties of living 'in-between' one's parent's home and a college dormitory, it is plausible to assume that the participants were in some ways anticipating what the others were going to or could say, and so were engaged in prospective inferencing. While it is not certain that B successfully anticipated what A was going to say (lines 4Á6), it was allowed to pass by A thereby displaying implicit agreement with B's inference. A's endorsement in line 13 of C's preceding utterance, on the other hand, displays an understanding that C's verbalization of the prospective inferences he had been making in relation to what A was saying in lines 6 and 8 was consistent with what she might have wanted or been expected to say. The verbalization of anticipatory inferences is also apparent in the following excerpt where the two students co-construct a joke about C's dentist.
(5) (Two male students chatting) (ICE-AUS, S1A-024) C has been telling M that his dentist is very good, to which M responds by teasing that C is probably charged a lot for the dentist's services (line 1). C responds in line 3 with a po-faced response (Drew 1987) , claiming his dentist will not do any work unless it is really necessary. He goes on to contrast his dentist's practice with others in line 5, but before he finishes this claim, M chimes in to complete it in a humorous way in line 6, and both speakers then laugh. While it is not clear what C might have said if he had finished what he was saying in line 5, M has anticipated what could have been said and so co-constructs a common stance about dentists who do unnecessary work with C. This common stance is explicitly endorsed by both M and C in lines 14Á 15, which indicates that whether or not the anticipatory inference made by M was the same as what C might have 'intended', it was accepted by both speakers as a plausible continuation of C's speaking turn. In making prospective inferences, then, it is important to note that it is not necessarily the degree of consistency with what a speaker might have 'intended', but rather its degree of plausibility, which can prove crucial. The second implication of conceptualizing communication as emergent is that such inferencing is inherently non-summative (Arundale 1999 (Arundale , 2008 Krippendorf 1970 Krippendorf , 1984 Pearce & Cronen 1980; Watzlawick et al. 1967) . Instead of attempting to explain communication in terms of 'the summative pairing of the cognitive processing activities of two separate individuals' (Arundale 2008: 242) , it is suggested here that we 'explain communication as a non-summative outcome of a single twoperson system' (Arundale 2008: 246) . Such a move turns on the finding that communication 'cannot be reduced without remainder to the level of individual psychological processing' (Arundale 2008: 246) , with evidence of this kind of nonsummative inferencing emerging, for instance, from analyses of the interactional management of joint attention (Kidwell & Zimmerman 2007) , as well as experiments investigating the performance of participants versus over-hearers in understanding discourse (Clark & Schaefer 1987; Schober & Clark 1989 ). This does not mean that monadic inferencing (i.e. autonomous cognition within the mind of an individual) does not occur, but rather that monadic inferencing is insufficient to account for the complex ways in which meanings emerge through communication.
Goal as a construct located in an individual mind might explain monologue, but even the cleverest and bravest reductionist does not have the alchemy to produce the creative spontaneity of dialogue out of two goals, in separate minds . . . Mentally driven theories can hypothesize a start to the interaction, but they must also account for the reciprocity and accommodation that characterize face-to-face interaction. Otherwise, the goals of the two individuals would run parallel, never affecting each other (Bavelas 1991: 22) .
The notion of 'dyadic cognizing' has thus been proposed by Arundale and Good (2002) as a means of conceptualizing the cognitive processes underlying communication in a way that is consistent with a conceptualization of communication as an interactional achievement. Their central claim is that the cognitive processes of participants in conversation are not autonomous but rather are interdependent (Arundale & Good 2002: 127) . In other words, rather than being 'the summative sequence of individual cognitive activities and/or actions' (Arundale & Good 2002: 124) , communication involves what they term 'dyadic cognizing' . Each participant's cognitive processes in using language involve concurrent operations temporally extended both forward in time in anticipation or projection, and backwards in time in hindsight or retroactive assessing of what has already transpired. As participants interact, these concurrent cognitive activities become fully interdependent or dyadic (Arundale & Good 2002: 122). It is thus argued by Arundale and Good (2002) that while autonomous cognitive processes are involved in human interaction, the traditional monadic view of cognition is not able to account for the emergent and non-summative properties of conversation and other forms of talk-in-interaction.
In the following excerpt from a conversation between two Australians meeting for the first time, we can see the way in which inferences from what is said can become interdependent through interaction (cf. Haugh 2008c: 62) . (6) Emma has been talking about how useful acupuncture can be in treating medical conditions up until this point. Chris's question in line 11 thus appears somewhat abruptly as there has been no discursive work that prepares Emma for it. The relatively long pause that follows Chris's question (line 12), before Emma responds in line 13, appears to give her time to consider how to interpret it. On the one hand, Chris's question can be taken as a tease and perhaps a challenge to Emma's medical knowledge as to whether she is familiar with the condition and could treat it. On the other hand, Chris's question can also be taken as an indirect request for help with the condition (more specifically a pre-request) (Levinson 1983; Liddicoat 2007: 132Á 133) . While both interpretings are plausible, it is only the latter which becomes operative when Emma responds with a hedged affirmative in line 13, before asking Chris whether he has this condition in line 16 (eventually leading to an offer of help from Emma later in this conversation). We do not know whether Emma's interpreting of Chris's question in line 11 is consistent with Chris's own interpreting of what he 'meant', as it is not possible to ascertain whether Chris had any particular a priori intention in mind when asking Emma about her ability to treat this condition. 4 What is important to note here instead is that the implicature arises as a consequence of Emma displaying an interpreting of Chris's question as an indirect request (line 13), and Chris's implicit ratification of this interpreting, which is evident from his subsequent response (line 14). Since the implicature is interactionally achieved (or conjointly co-constituted in Arundale's terms), the inferencing underlying this implicature is necessarily interdependent. In uttering the question in line 11, Chris may infer that his question proactively affords at least two interpretings (a tease or an implied request), or perhaps that Emma will infer only one of these. In her response in line 13, Emma displays an understanding that indicates she has inferred the question is potentially implying a request, and so retroactively constrains the utterance to only one interpreting (an implied request).
5 Upon hearing this response, Chris may then infer that Emma has understood the question as a pre-request, and so responds in line 14 with an utterance ratifying Emma's displayed interpreting and thus her inference. In this way, we can see that Chris's and Emma's inferences about what is meant by Chris's question in line 11 are dependent on the other's displays of the inferences they have made. Their inferences thus become fully interdependent through the course of this interaction.
Interdependent inferencing is also apparent in the following excerpt from a telephone conversation between two male university friends who are delicately 'negotiating' whether they will do something together on Saturday night. (7) , it is also interpretable as opening up an invitation sequence (more specifically, a pre-invitation) (Levinson 1983; Liddicoat 2007: 129; Sacks 1992: 529; Schegloff 2007: 129) . In other words, Steve may infer that Cameron is possibly thinking about inviting Steve to do something together that night. Steve's response in line 20 ('I dunno'), however, is equivocal in that it is neither a 'go-ahead' nor a 'blocking' response, but rather is a hedged orienting towards Cameron's preinvitation (Schegloff 2007: 31Á32) . In doing so, Steve leaves it open as to whether he is potentially interested in doing something together with Cameron. Steve then, in the same line, asks what Cameron is doing, in order to find out more about the possible invitation. In other words, at this point in the sequence Cameron has potentially initiated an invitation sequence with Steve, and Steve has responded by displaying interest in the invitation that is contingent on what it involves. Neither of them, however, have committed themselves to a response that confirms this as an invitation sequence (possibly to avoid looking 'desperate' and thereby save self-face and/or to avoid being seen as overly 'pushy' and thereby save other-face) (Haugh 2008e ). Cameron's subsequent utterance in line 22 does not yet move into an invitation either, as he responds equivocally with a telling of what he has been planning to do (that is, on the one hand, he has a party to go to which would seem to indicate the invitation sequence cannot proceed, but on the other hand, he is not very interested in going to the party). Crucially, the fact that Cameron's response in line 22 to Steve's inquiry in line 20 is 'oh-prefaced' (Heritage 1998: 296) potentially displays an understanding that the inquiry being responded to is problematic in regards to Steve's underlying presupposition, namely that Cameron already has an event in mind to which he wants to invite Steve. This is further developed in Cameron's subsequent utterance in line 24 where he hints that he would like another invitation by saying he is looking for an excuse to get out of going to the party. Thus while a hedged response to a pre-invitation often involves a move to a telling of what the invitation would have been (Drew 1984; Liddicoat 2007: 131; Schegloff 2007: 33) , in this sequence it projects an accounting for why the pre-invitation was issued by Cameron.
Steve's subsequent displayed interpreting of Cameron's response (to Steve's inquiry) as an account rather than a telling is evident from the 'oh' and 'right' which receipt 'new' information and understanding respectively on Steve's part in line 26 (Heritage 1984b; Liddicoat 2007: 152; Schegloff 2007: 118) . Steve then issues his own pre-invitation in asking whether Cameron has seen 'Lethal Weapon'. A blocking response in line 28, is followed by Steve issuing another pre-invitation in line 30, which is followed by a go-ahead response in line 32, and finally an invitation to go to see 'Patriot Games' (line 34) to which Cameron agrees (line 36).
In this excerpt, then, we can see the interpretation of Cameron's initial question in line 18 as a pre-invitation remains open until at least line 26 when Steve displays an understanding that an invitation to go out together is what they are indeed talking about. While Cameron's question proactively affords an interpreting as a preinvitation (as well as a straightforward question), both Steve and Cameron display understandings that leave what inferences can be made from Cameron's question open until Cameron begins to constrain the inferences that can be legitimately made from his question in lines 22 and 24. However, instead of straightforwardly preceding into the issuing of the invitation by Cameron, Steve initiatives his own invitation sequence with a projected pre-invitation in line 26 which eventually leads to Steve inviting Cameron to go to see a movie. In this way, we can see that the inferences both Cameron and Steve make in regards to interpreting Cameron's question in line 18, and crucially, Cameron's response in lines 22Á24 to Steve's inquiry, are dependent on the responses the other person makes. In other words, their inferences become interdependent through the interaction as 'the participants continually both proactively afford and retroactively constrain one another's comprehending and producing of every utterance' (Arundale & Good 2002: 135) .
The existence of this kind of interdependent inferential work is thus consistent with Arundale and Good's (2002) proposal that not only monadic cognition, but also dyadic cognizing underpins communication, as previously discussed. However, such a line of argument draws into question the central place intention is commonly assumed to play in the conceptualization of communication in pragmatics. In the final section, the implications of this move for reconceptualizing communication in pragmatics are thus discussed.
Implications for Reconceptualizing Communication in Pragmatics
In the preceding analysis of interactions there has been an implicit shift away from the traditional conceptualization of communication in cognitive-philosophical pragmatics as involving the recognition or attribution of intentions to the speaker. This move, however, should not be taken as a denial of the inherent directedness or aboutness of the inferential work underlying communication, and thus intentionality in the sense proposed by Brentano and his student, Husserl (Jacob 2003; Jaszczolt 1999: 88; Nuyts 2000: 2Á3; cf. Searle 1983: 1) . 7 The notion of dyadic cognizing, for instance, presupposes that 'all of these inferences have ''objects'' and so are ''intentional'' in Brentano's sense' (Arundale 2008: 258, fn. 4) . But as Duranti (2006): 33) argues, this sense of the 'aboutness' or 'directionality' of talk 'does not presuppose that a well-formed thought precedes action'. In other words, we might be able to recognize the 'directionality' of particular communicative acts (e.g. through talk and embodiment) without being able to specify whether speakers did or did not have the narrow intention to communicate what is being attributed to them by their listeners (Duranti 2006: 36) .
Such a position depends, of course, on clearly differentiating the broader notion of intentionality from the notion of intention, a distinction which has often been glossed over in pragmatics. This move away from speaker intentions as being central to the conceptualization of communication also raises the question of just how we know what is (being) communicated. One possibility is the notion of accountability, originally proposed in the work of Garfinkel (1967) and Sacks (1964) [1992] : 4Á5), where interlocutors hold themselves and others accountable for meanings that arise from what is said (Heritage 1984a) . Heritage (1988) further divides accountability into two types: normative and moral accountability. The former, normative accountability, refers to 'the taken-for-granted level of reasoning through which a running index of action and interaction is created and sustained' (Heritage 1988: 128) . The latter, moral accountability, encompasses 'the level of overt explanation in which social actors give accounts of what they are doing in terms of reasons, motives or causes' (Heritage 1988: 128) . It is into the latter type of accountability that the discussion of speaker intentions perhaps best falls (Arundale 2008: 257; Haugh 2008b,c) , although Arundale (2008) goes on to argue that intention in this sense has no 'privileged status' amongst other accounts that may be offered: when persons do offer accounts for their own or other's utterances or behaviours, they can be observed to offer a much wider range of accounts indexing situational factors, automatic, overlearned, or formulaic actions, interference by others, emotional stressors, lapses in cognitive abilities, and more (Arundale 2008: 257) .
It is therefore not simply through inferences about speakers' intentions, but instead by holding each other accountable to the proactive affording and retroactive constraining of each other's interpreting and producing of each utterance in interaction (Arundale & Good 2002: 135) , that communication is possible. This is not to say that we necessarily always end up with shared or common understandings of what is communicated. It is just as easy to talk of diverging interpretings as it is of converging interpretings within this approach (Arundale 2008: 250; Haugh 2008b Questions remain though as to what further constraints there might be on dyadic inferential work. As noted in the first section of this paper, the emphasis on sociocultural knowledge and practices in conceptualizations of communication in sociocultural-interactional pragmatics is clearly another dimension that constrains what is or can be communicated (see Liddicoat 2009 ). Such sociocultural knowledge and practices may include lexical or phraseological knowledge as discussed in Kecskes's (2008) Dynamic Model of Meaning, or cultural scripts as discussed by Wierzbicka (2003) and Goddard (2006) . Another constraint on inferential work is the interactional machinery on which such inferential work depends (Levinson 2006a,b; Schegloff 2006) . Much of this work points to the need to reconcile our understandings of monadic cognizing, dyadic cognizing, and, possibly, a kind of shared or 'group' cognizing that underlie communication. There thus remains much to explore along the path of reconceptualizing communication in pragmatics.
Transcription Conventions
The following transcription symbols are utilized: 
